Don't let this post stop discussion of the new Pruss paper (in the post below this one). But since life is short I thought I'd put up a further post.
In a forthcoming x-phi paper (here) I give Reasons-Responsive and Deep Self theorists a (bit of a) hard time. Basically, I argue that my results indicate that consciousness is much more important to free will than the considerations motivating either view. But both kinds of theorist rarely say much about consciousness. Why not? I wouldn’t mind hearing from either kind of theorist on this question in the comments.
(In that paper I think aloud a bit about how a Deep Self or Reasons-Responsive theorist might proceed. I won’t go into that here.)
Another question: are there any good arguments for or against a consciousness-free will connection? I might throw out an argument for and an argument against in a later post, but maybe these arguments will come up in discussion. In any case, I want to hear from y’all on this.
A final question: what aspect or form of consciousness seems most relevant to FW/MR, and why? I’ve always assumed the relevant form was phenomenal consciousness, and that the relevant aspects involved the kinds of phenomenally conscious states and processes associated with deliberation and choice (but what, exactly, are those?). But Neil Levy has just written an excellent book on the consciousness-moral responsibility connection, and for Levy phenomenal consciousness is largely irrelevant. Is Levy right to ditch phenomenal consciousness?
So, to review, three issues I’d like to discuss: why do leading theories of moral responsibility say so little about consciousness (and - especially given that the folk seem to find consciousness very important for FW/MR - is this a mistake)? What are the arguments for or against a consciousness-free will connection? What are the relevant forms of consciousness at issue: phenomenal, various non-phenomenal notions (like self-awareness or some kind of accesssibility relation)?