In conversation, Bert Baumgaertner (UI) and Michael Goldsby (WSU) have suggested another way of contrasting my view with Vargas’ view.
First, there is revisionism 1.0: Who cares what the folk think? What matters is what philosophers think, for “free will” is a term of art. Next there is revisionism 1.1: The folk conception of free will is different from the concept we should adopt but we should adopt philosophical compatibilism. This is Vargas’ view. Lastly, there is revisionism 1.2: The folk conception of free will is generally speaking the concept we should adopt but it needs some tweaking here and there. This is Nahmias’ view. Ultimately the difference between Vargas and me is that I lean more toward revisionism 1.2 and even 1.0 than revisionism 1.1.
Manuel suggests that version 1.0 isn't a version of revisionism at all. Perhaps it is best characterized as anti-revisionist and the real debate is between versions 1.1 and 1.2.
Here is where I get confused and uncomfortable. I want to say that there is a core concept of free will that is aligned with sourcehood or the ability to do otherwise or whatever -- something neutral wrt to the compatibility problem. Any supposed connections between the core concept and incompatibilism (or compatibilism, for that matter) are the result of fallacious reasoning.
Can I say this? It isn't clear what would count as evidence for such a claim.