This will be the final post. It was fun blogging with you for a month, and I am grateful to Thomas for the invitation, and to everyone who joined in. As many of you know, in addition to the free will problem I have been working for some years now on moral paradoxes and various other weird stuff in normative and applied ethics. My book 10 Moral Paradoxes was the first result, and some more recent papers have followed. If someone wants to get a picture of my recent doings, "Why Moral Paradoxes Matter: Teflon Immorality and the Perversity of Life" Philosophical Studies (online preview), would be a good place to start. As a result of all this wading in weirdness I have recently begun to develop a concept that I call "Crazy Ethics" (or CE), and here I'll say a little bit about it, and then indicate why I think that it is very much relevant to the way we should view the free will problem.
WHAT IS CRAZY ETHICS?
I do not use the term “crazy” pejoratively for ethical views I disagree with (as when one says "that view is just crazy"), nor am I referring to views that everyone should think are crazy, such as genocidal Nazi views. Rather, I use “crazy ethics” (or CE) as a semi-descriptive term for some views that we ourselves hold, or that we think might be true. I claim that some true ethical views are, in this sense, crazy. To say that the free will problem is "crazy" in this sense is to say that we have good reasons to believe that plausible views on the free will debate strongly exhibit the characteristics of crazy ethics.